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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Since 2008, the global economic downturn has significantly in-
creased operating pressures on major corporations. Profit margins have 
been squeezed. Increased competition, decreased demand, and the peren-
nial pressure to meet or exceed earnings forecasts add to the bottom line 
pressures on corporate boards. The 2012 Ernst & Young Annual Global 
Fraud Survey (Ernst & Young Survey) paints an exceptionally bleak pic-
ture.
1
 It details a debilitating nexus between a challenging economic out-
look and “institutional fatigue,” which inhibits capacity to deal with a 
pervasive and growing problem.
2
 Hard times, it concludes, strain ethical 
standards.
3
 Significantly, this increased corporate tolerance for corrup-
tion coincides with a marked preference by regulators in settling, rather 
than litigating, enforcement actions. 
This trend is most notable in the United States, where fines linked 
to deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs) have been running at record 
levels.
4
 Most recently, focus has shifted to corruption in the setting of 
benchmark interest rates, where at least sixteen banks and three broker-
age houses are currently under investigation by regulatory authorities 
over the suspected manipulation of the London Interbank Offered Rate 
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(LIBOR).
5
 To date, the United States has levied just over $1.8 billion
6
 in 
penalties from three banks that have executed negotiated settlements. 
These agreements, which amount to extrajudicial contracts, significantly 
enhance the bargaining power of prosecutorial agencies. The flexing of 
regulatory and legal muscle is also apparent in the United Kingdom, 
where the Crime and Courts Act 2013 (CC Act)
7
 introduced into U.K. 
law for the first time the concept of deferred prosecutions.
8
 
The justification offered by the United Kingdom for the introduc-
tion of deferred prosecutions, as set out in the Ministry of Justice consul-
tation paper,
9
 is the capacity of the mechanism to enforce behavioral 
change.
10
 In particular, the consultation paper highlighted how effica-
cious deployment of external monitors through deferred prosecutions can 
be in evaluating ongoing corporate commitment to the introduction of 
remedial measures.
11
 Three additional tactical and strategic advantages 
were also canvassed. First, it can reduce the time it takes to complete 
complex investigations.
12
 Second, and if appropriate, demands for corpo-
rate exit from particular high-risk activities or markets can be built into 
the calculation.
13
 Third, significant revenue can accrue to the Treasury, 
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In both the academic and practitioner communities, the expansion 
of prosecutorial authority is greeted with markedly different responses on 
either side of the Atlantic.
15
 In part, this can be traced to substantial vari-
ation in enforcement priorities, past performance, and the availability of 
liability-reducing defenses. For example, with respect to allegations of 
foreign bribery, the United Kingdom’s Bribery Act 2010 (Bribery Act)
16
 
closely tracks the United States’ Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 
(FCPA)
17
 in its definition of what constitutes an offense; however, the 
Bribery Act departs substantially in that corporate liability can be re-
duced if “adequate procedures” are in place.
18
 The relatively sanguine 
nature of the response in the United Kingdom also reflects the prior cata-
strophic failure of the Serious Fraud Office as an effective prosecutorial 
agency.
19
 This has led to an underestimation of the risks associated with 
providing these agencies with the power to broker settlements. 
This Article argues that the expansion of prosecutorial authority 
without appropriate accountability restraints is a major tactical and stra-
tegic error. It examines the benefits and pitfalls of using the deferred 
prosecution mechanism to combat economic crime. It highlights the 
scope of its actual and proposed application. It assesses whether en-
hanced prosecutorial flexibility enhances or inhibits the capacity to en-
force behavioral change. Finally, it evaluates whether the mechanism can 
be made subject to effective oversight. It argues that the current frame-
work in the United States is highly problematic, leading to settlements 
that generate newspaper headlines but not necessarily cultural change. It 
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also runs the risk of privileging a form of enforcement that operates out-
side appropriate legal safeguards. The approach canvassed by the British 
authorities offers only a partial improvement in this process. For negoti-
ated prosecutions to be truly effective, they require a much firmer norma-
tive basis. 
The Article is structured as follows: Part II outlines the growing 
scale of and tolerance for economic corruption as outlined in the Ernst & 
Young Survey. Part III explores how and why deferred prosecution has 
become the enforcement tool of choice in the United States, with particu-
lar reference to breaches of the FCPA and the recent LIBOR scandal. 
Part IV evaluates the accountability deficiencies associated with its ap-
plication, both in terms of over-enforcement and under-enforcement. Part 
V evaluates the extension of the mechanism in the United Kingdom and 
assesses the extent to which the refinements address the accountability 
deficit. Finally, Part VI concludes. 
II. THE CORRUPTION NEXUS 
In the United States, corporate misconduct rarely gets litigated to a 
conclusion. Instead, prosecutorial authorities privilege negotiated settle-
ments with deferred prosecution agreements being routinely applied to 
settle allegations of bribery and corruption under the FCPA.
20
 While this 
approach generates headlines, it appears powerless to either stop the in-
cidence of corruption or provide granular guidance on how to develop 
more effective compliance programs. At a global level, the Ernst & 
Young Survey is one of the most detailed snapshots of the bribery and 
corruption challenges facing multinational corporations currently under-
taken. An understanding of the scale and tolerance for economic corrup-
tion is essential to explaining the proliferation of the U.S. Department of 
Justice’s (DOJ) preference for utilizing deferred prosecutions. The sur-
vey is drawn from a sample of 1,700 senior executives.
21
 It includes re-
spondents drawn from incumbent chief financial officers (CFOs) and 
senior executives charged with running the legal, compliance, and inter-
nal audit functions of major corporations across forty-three different 
countries.
22
 One of the most “troubling” findings is what Ernst & Young 
deems a growing widespread acceptance of unethical business practic-
es—for example, 64% of respondents believe that the incidence of com-
                                                 
 20. See SEC Enforcement Actions: FCPA Cases, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec. 
gov/spotlight/fcpa/fcpa-cases.shtml (last updated Jan. 9, 2014).  
 21. ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 1, at 1. 
 22. See id. at 29. 
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pliance failure has increased because of the downturn.
23
 The trend is par-
ticularly apparent in East Asia—for example, 60% of respondents in In-
donesia suggested it was acceptable to make cash payments to secure 
new contracts, and 36% of respondents in Vietnam suggested it was 
permissible to misstate financial accounts.
24
 
The decline in ethical commitment is traced to a lack of training 
and, more significantly, to mixed messages from senior management as 
to the importance of compliance with Anti-Bribery and Corruption Poli-
cies (ABACP).
25
 As Ernst & Young conclude, if action is not taken to 
hold offenders to account, stated commitment to high standards remains 
an exercise in symbolism.
26
 It is also an exceptionally risky strategy giv-
en the global rise in enforcement. While many of the executives surveyed 
reported having sophisticated compliance systems in place, these systems 
were not subject to ongoing external testing.
27
 Only 33% reported using 
external law firms or consultants to provide assurance.
28
 In a significant 
finding, 54% of CFOs surveyed had not taken ABACP training,
29
 while 
52% of all respondents reported that the board was not sufficiently aware 
of operating risk.
30
 As well as specific local conditions, the survey that 




Unless gaps between controls and compliance programs in each en-
tity are identified and procedures rectified, the conflation of existence of 
control and effective risk management could magnify, rather than re-
solve, the litigation threat.
32
 However, the overriding identified risk, and 
resulting legal exposure, focused on how a corporation manages the leg-
acy and ongoing relationships with third parties.
33
 
According to Ernst & Young, “many companies are failing to adopt 
even the most basic controls to manage these third-party relationships”
34
 
(e.g., only 59% use an approved supplier database; 56% adopted a back-
ground checking system; 50% do not check the ownership structure of 
the third party as part of routine due diligence; 55% either do not have 
                                                 
 23. See id. at 4 fig.1, 7 fig.4. 
 24. See id. at 5 fig.2, 9 fig.5. 
 25. See id. at 6. 
 26. See id. at 28. 
 27. See id. at 1. 
 28. Id. at 7 fig.4, 11 fig.7.  
 29. Id. at 3. 
 30. Id. at 3. 
 31. See id. at 11. 
 32. See id. 
 33. See id. at 8. 
 34. Id. at 9. 
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audit rights or check audit procedures with the third-party entity).
35
 Ac-
cording to the global professional advisory firm, this constitutes a “real 
problem” precisely because third-party due diligence is “increasingly 
expected” by the DOJ as well as the authorities in England and Wales.
36
 
Disturbingly, 15% of the CFO respondents report unawareness that the 
corporation can be held liable for the actions of third-party agents.
37
 Ig-
norance is not, however, a defense when it comes to prosecution for vio-
lations of the Bribery Act or the incredibly malleable application of the 
FCPA by the DOJ. 
The DOJ has secured record fine levels for the prosecution of of-
fenses linked to FCPA violations.
38
 Moreover, a significant strengthening 
of the incentives for corporate whistleblowing has emerged, linked to the 
introduction of a bounty system under the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Re-
form and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd–Frank).
39
 Section 922 
of Dodd–Frank authorizes the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) to institute an award scheme.
40
 Material information leading to a 
successful rendering of a fine in excess of $1 million makes the whistle-
blower eligible for a payment between 10%–30% of the financial penal-
ty.
41
 These reforms, which have applicability far beyond the FCPA arena, 
underscore the critical importance of effective systems to police deviance 
within the firm, as the Swiss bank UBS has most recently discovered.
42
 
The problem facing corporations is that the definition of what con-
stitutes an effective compliance program is itself constantly shifting. 
Moreover, the compliance program is of variable use in defending a cor-
porate liability action. In the United Kingdom, for example, guidance 
issued by the Ministry of Justice suggests that adequate procedures can 
constitute a defense.
43
 Defendants must demonstrate, however, that oper-
ating risks—including sector, region, reliance on intermediaries, and use 
                                                 
 35. Id. at 9 fig.6, 13 fig.9. 
 36. See id. at 9; see also MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 9, ¶¶ 37–43. 
 37. ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 1, at 13. 
 38. See Garrett, supra note 4, at 33. 
 39. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 
Stat. 1851 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12, 15, & 26 U.S.C.). 
 40. Id. at § 922 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6). 
 41. Id.; see also SEC Implementation of the Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21F of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. § 240 (2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules 
/final/2011/34-64545.pdf; Emily Stephenson, SEC Approves $50,000 Payout Under New Whistle-
blower Program, REUTERS (Aug. 21, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/21/us-financial-
regulation-idUSBRE87K0UE20120821. 
 42. See Patrick Temple-West & Lynnley Browning, Whistleblower in UBS Tax Case Gets 
Record $104 Million, REUTERS (Sept. 11, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/11/us-usa-
tax-birkenfeld-idUSBRE88A0TE20120911. 
 43. See MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 5 n.3. 
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of corporate hospitality—have been taken into consideration in the de-
sign and ongoing monitoring of compliance programs. The corporation 
must demonstrate that it has conducted effective due diligence of all as-
sociated personnel. It must demonstrate that communication and training 
is in place and that commitment to the policy is warranted through, for 
example, external engagement with the media and practitioners. 
In sharp contrast, the United States fails to define the parameters of 
adequate compliance in the FCPA legislation and therefore fails to pro-
vide concrete guidance for corporations. The DOJ, does, however, rou-
tinely publish the terms of compliance programs, which serve a broader 
demonstrative effect. For example, in United States v. Panalpina World 
Transport (Holding) Ltd.,
44
 Panalpina was mandated to develop compli-
ance standards and procedures. These mandated compliance standards 
and procedures, which included internal controls, ethics, and compliance 
programs, were based on a risk assessment addressing the individual cir-
cumstances of Panalpina. While this assessment particularly focused on 
the foreign bribery risks the company faced, it also addressed Panal-
pina’s geographical organization; interactions with various types and 
levels of government officials; industrial sectors of operation; involve-
ment in joint venture arrangements; importance of licenses and permits 
in its operations; degree of governmental oversight and inspection; and 




Furthermore, certainty cannot be assured through application of 
case law precedent given the extent to which prosecutions of violations 
of the FCPA are overwhelmingly settled rather than litigated. The result 
is that, in effect, what constitutes compliance means solely what the 
prosecutors say it means.
46
 
The primary battleground on which this debate is fought (and inten-
tions ascertained) is in the negotiations over whether and on what terms a 
prosecutor is prepared to countenance a deferred prosecution. These pre-
trial diversion agreements force corporations to accept a partial reading 
of the record that corresponds to the worldview of the prosecutorial 
agency. They prohibit questioning in return for a deferral of prosecu-
tion. Notwithstanding the criticism that its use has contributed to the 
                                                 
 44. Deferred Prosecution Agreement C, at 1–7, United States v. Panalpina World Transport 
(Holding) Ltd., No. 4:10-cr-00769 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 4, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/ 
criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/panalpina-world/11-04-10panalpina-world-dpa.pdf. 
 45. Id. at 66. 
 46. See Examining Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Crime and Drugs of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 14–16 (2010) (state-
ment of Andrew Weissman, Partner, Jenner & Block, LLP). 
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emergence of a “shadow regulatory state,”
47
 bred over-compliance, and 
reflects an extrajudicial contract,
48
 the deferred prosecution has emerged 
as one of the most potent weapons in the prosecutorial armory. 
For example, the DOJ has entered into three negotiated settlements 
to date with respect to LIBOR manipulation, a case complicated by a 
number of features.
49
 It involves alleged collusion by banks that were 
panel members for LIBOR, TIBOR, and EURIBOR.
50
 Regulators across 
many jurisdictions are involved, including the United States, United 
Kingdom, European Union, Japan, Canada, and Switzerland.
51
 The legal 
issues are complex, and the evidence and investigations involve both fi-
nancial regulators and antitrust regulators. From one perspective, the 
benefits to the regulator of entering into a negotiated settlement in such a 
widespread and systemic case are vast. Without access to corporate in-
ternal investigations in exchange for leniency, regulatory investigations 
would likely have reached a stalemate. 
The Ernst & Young Survey is likely only to strengthen resolve at the 
DOJ and in London—where the United Kingdom government has been 
long pressed to follow the United States’ example in using creative en-
forcement to add to prosecutorial capacity.
52
 Partly in response to per-
ceived failings to prosecute under the OECD Convention on Combating 
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transac-
tions, the United Kingdom introduced into law for the first time the con-
cept of deferred prosecutions. The Solicitor General, Edward Garnier, 
has claimed it would provide a more effective way of “dealing with crim-
inality without causing collateral damage.”
53
 It is, however, a mechanism 
that is exceptionally susceptible to abuse. In the following section, the 
nature of that risk to both corporations and prosecutorial authority is 
traced. 
                                                 
 47. See COPLAND, supra note 15. 
 48. See Koehler, supra note 15. 
 49. See sources cited supra note 6. 
 50. See The Libor Scandal: The Rotten Heart of Finance, ECONOMIST, July 7, 2012, available 
at http://www.economist.com/node/21558281. 
 51. Id. 
 52. See Nancy Z. Boswell, Letter to the Editor, SFO Can Learn from US Approach to Corrup-
tion, FIN. TIMES (July 7, 2008), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/21ea2326-4bc1-11dd-a490-000077b 
07658.html #axzz1wnbQTu00. 
 53. Caroline Binham, Plans Revealed for US-Style Plea Bargains, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2011), 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/3ed306d2-e9e9-11e0-a149-00144feab49a.html#axzz1wnbQTu00. 
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III. TACKLING CREATIVE COMPLIANCE THROUGH CREATIVE 
ENFORCEMENT 
A.  Deconstructing the Use of Negotiated Settlements 
The accounting and conflicts-of-interest scandals at the turn of the 
millennium rekindled interest in the use of creative enforcement to deal 
with economic crime. At the federal level, it followed the successful ap-
plication of non-prosecution agreements by then-New York State Attor-
ney General, Eliot Spitzer, to force both executive regime change and 
substantive compliance recalibration in the financial services sector.
54
 
Ever since, the mechanism increasingly formed a critical component of 
the prosecutorial toolbox across diverse corporate settings.
55
 
At its core, the deferred prosecution involves an extrajudicial con-
tract between the prosecutorial authority and the individual or entity un-
der investigation. In return for a commitment to enter into a series of le-
gally binding undertakings, the severity of which is dependent largely on 
prosecutorial acumen, the entity can secure a deferral of charges or a 
non-prosecution agreement. The policy was originally applied to juvenile 
offenders as an alternative to custodial sentences and the longer-term 
effects on the disadvantaged or alienated of having a criminal convic-
tion.
56
 It was first used in the corporate sector in 1994, with the prosecu-
tion of Prudential Securities. It has since found application in a range of 
sectors,
57
 most notably in cases involving corruption, where the DOJ is 
primarily responsible for all criminal enforcement and for civil enforce-
ment of the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA with respect to domestic 
concerns, foreign companies, and nationals. On a smaller scale, the SEC 
is responsible for civil enforcement of the anti-bribery provisions with 
respect to issuers. 
The negotiated prosecution in the United States offers a range of 
immediate benefits to the prosecutor. First, executives can still be made 
amenable to the court, thereby serving the public policy imperative of 
                                                 
 54. See Justin O’Brien, The Politics of Enforcement: Eliot Spitzer, State–Federal Relations, 
and the Redesign of Financial Regulation, 35 PUBLIUS 449 (2005). 
 55. See Drury D. Stevenson & Nicholas J. Wagoner, FCPA Sanctions: Too Big Too Debar, 80 
FORDHAM L. REV. 775, 778 (2011). 
 56. See generally JUSTIN O’BRIEN, ENGINEERING A FINANCIAL BLOODBATH: HOW SUB-PRIME 
SECURITIZATION DESTROYED THE LEGITIMACY OF FINANCIAL CAPITALISM 48–56 (2000); see also 
JUSTIN O’BRIEN, REDESIGNING FINANCIAL REGULATION: THE POLITICS OF ENFORCEMENT 123–69 
(2006). For assessment of the DOJ’s usage, see U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-
636T, CORPORATE CRIME: PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS ON DOJ’S USE AND OVERSIGHT OF 
DEFERRED PROSECUTION AND NON-PROSECUTION AGREEMENTS (2009), available at http://www.ga 
o.gov/assets/130/122853.pdf. 
 57. See infra Figure 1. 
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individual accountability. Second, the corporation can be forced to en-
sure that control deficiencies highlighted by the investigation are ade-
quately addressed. Third, the prosecutorial agency is given explicit oper-
ational veto over implementation of remedial reform through the option 
of appointing an external monitor. Fourth, as noted above, the mecha-
nism provides a source of revenue. 




















Figure 1 depicts that, over time, almost half of all deferred prosecu-
tion agreements relate to three types of crime: 31% relate to matters aris-
ing under the FCPA, 16% relate to cases of mail and wire fraud, and 9% 
relate to matters arising under the Medicare and Medicaid Patient Protec-
tion Act of 1987.
59
 Similar percentages are observable in the use of non-
prosecution agreements, where 22% relate to matters arising under the 
FCPA, 9% relate to mail and wire fraud, and 20% relate to drug mis-
branding and antitrust violations. 
The rapid expansion of extrajudicial prosecutorial resolutions over 
time
60
 can be traced to a debate within the DOJ, in particular, on how to 
deal with the collateral damage associated with charging a corporation 
                                                 
 58. All empirical data sourced from Brandon L. Garrett & Jon Ashley, Federal Organizational 
Prosecution Agreements, UNIV. VA. SCH. LAW, http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/prosecution_ 
agreements/home.suphp (last updated Jan. 1, 2014). 
 59. Medicare and Medicaid Patient Protection Act of 1987, 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (2013). 
 60. See infra Figure 2. 
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with a criminal offense.
61
 From the beginning it was also clear that the 
rationale fed into a wider narrative concerning the systemic failure of 
corporate governance in the United States. As Larry Thompson, Deputy 
Attorney General, stated in 2003, the framework was designed to “ad-
dress the efficacy of the corporate governance mechanisms in place with-
in a corporation to ensure that these measures are truly effective rather 
than mere paper programs.”
62
 
Nine specific factors were to be taken into consideration: 
the nature and seriousness of the offense, including the risk of harm 
to the public[;] . . . the pervasiveness of wrongdoing within the cor-
poration[;] . . . the corporation’s history of similar conduct[;] . . . the 
corporation’s timely and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing and its 
willingness to cooperate[;] . . . the existence and adequacy of the 
corporation’s compliance program[;] . . . the corporation’s remedial 
actions[;] . . . collateral consequences[;] . . . the adequacy of the 
prosecution of individuals responsible[;] . . . the adequacy of reme-
dies such as civil or regulatory enforcement actions.
63
 
The exceptionally broad parameters of deferred prosecutions, set 
out in what has been termed the “Thompson Memo,” significantly en-
hanced prosecutorial discretionary power to determine the public interest 
in charging a corporation and whether that interest is advanced by agree-







                                                 
 61. See Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Att’y Gen., on Principles of Federal 
Prosecution of Business Organizations to the Heads of Dep’t Components, U.S. Att’ys (Jan. 20, 
2003), available at http://www.albany.edu/acc/courses/acc695spring2008/thompson%20memo.pdf. 
 62. Id. at 11; see also Q&A with Manhattan DA Robert Morgenthau, BUSINESS WEEK (Dec. 
22, 2002), http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/02_51/b3813011.htm; Robert M. Mor-
genthau, These Islands Aren’t Just a Shelter from Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2012, at SR8, availa-
ble at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/06/opinion/sunday/these-islands-arent-just-a-shelter-from-
taxes.html. 
 63. See Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, supra note 61, at 3. Following criticism of the 
attorney–client waiver, most notably in the prosecution of KPMG, this component was subsequently 
dropped. See Justin O’Brien, Accounting and Accountability Failure: The Impact of the Kaplan 
Ruling on Corporate Enforcement, 1 COMPLIANCE & REG. J. 28 (2006). 
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Figure 2 shows that prior to the DOJ updating its guidance through 
the Thompson Memo in 2003, deferred prosecution agreements were 
rarely pursued. Federal prosecutors trying to evaluate the appropriateness 
of deferred prosecution agreements were largely “left to their own discre-
tion, with few if any applicable standards upon which to rely.”
65
 The 
Thompson Memo provided a framework for evaluating corporate con-
duct. It instructed federal prosecutors to consider deferred prosecution 
agreements and non-prosecution agreements in appropriate circumstanc-
es.
66
 Since 2003, the number of deferred prosecution agreements has 
consistently increased, driven by sector-specific crises such as the col-
lapse of Arthur Andersen (accounting fraud), the U.S. Senate investiga-
tions into the U.N. Oil for Food Programme (bribery and corruption), and 
more generally, the political environment arising in connection with the 
financial downturn of 2008.
67
 
There are major policy imperatives for advocating such an ap-
proach. The potential collateral damage arising from criminal prosecu-
tion was highlighted by the implosion of the accounting firm Arthur An-
                                                 
 64. Data sourced from Garrett & Ashley, supra note 58. 
 65. F. Joseph Warin & Jason C. Schwartz, Deferred Prosecutions: The Need for Specialized 
Guidelines for Corporate Defendants, 23 J. CORP. L. 121, 127 (1997). 
 66. See Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, supra note 61. 
 67. See generally Sharon Oded, Deferred Prosecution Agreements: Prosecutorial Balance in 
Times of Economic Meltdown, 2 LAW J. SOC. JUST. 65 (2011). 
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dersen in 2002, which was subject to criminal prosecution over its al-
leged role in the Enron scandal.
68
 Although Arthur Andersen had been 
offered, but declined, a deferred prosecution (and the guilty verdict was 
overturned on appeal),
69
 the decision to prosecute led to the destruction 
of a storied brand and the loss of thousands of jobs. Thereinafter the U.S. 
DOJ, while emboldened by the higher prosecutorial penalties mandated 
in the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002,
70




It has proved to be an exceptionally lucrative business for the 
DOJ,
72
 most notably in its application to alleged violations of the FCPA, 
with the use of deferred prosecutions centralized within the Fraud Divi-
sion.
73
 The FCPA dates back to the bribery scandals at Lockheed and 
coincided with the fallout from Watergate.
74
 It was enacted for the pur-
pose of making it unlawful for certain classes of persons and entities to 
make payments to foreign government officials to assist in obtaining or 
retaining business.
75
 Since 1977, the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA 
have applied to all U.S. persons and certain foreign issuers of securi-
ties.
76
 With the enactment of the International Anti-Bribery and Fair 
Competition Act of 1998,
77
 the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA now 
also apply to foreign firms and persons who cause, directly or through 
agents, an act in furtherance of such a corrupt payment to take place 
within the territory of the United States.
78
 The FCPA has extraordinary 
extraterritorial reach—it potentially applies to any individual, corpora-
tion, director, employee, or agent
79
 whose actions satisfy at least one cri-
terion of the act’s following three subsets: 
 Practices by “Domestic Concerns”—being any individual who 
is a citizen, national or resident of the United States, or any 
                                                 
 68. See Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696 (2005). 
 69. Id. at 698. 
 70. Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub.L.107-204, 116 Stat. 745; see also Note, Go Directly to 
Jail: White Collar Sentencing After The Sarbanes–Oxley Act, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1728 (2009). 
 71. See JUSTIN O’BRIEN, WALL STREET ON TRIAL: A CORRUPTED STATE? 283 (2003). 
 72. See infra Figure 3. 
 73. See infra Figure 4. 
 74. Mike Koehler, The Story of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 929, 932–
34 (2012). 
 75. Id. at 1003. 
 76. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: An Overview, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, http://www.justice. 
gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2013). 
 77. See The International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 
(2013), available at  http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/docs/fcpa-english.pdf. 
 78. Id. § 78dd-2. 
 79. Id. §§ 78dd-1 to -3. 
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corporation, partnership, sole proprietorship, or other business 
organization or trust, which has the United States as its princi-
pal place of business;
80
 
 Practices by “Issuer”—being any corporation that issued securi-
ties registered in the United States or any corporation that is re-
quired by the SEC to file periodic reports;
81
 and 
 Persons other than Issuers or Domestic Concerns—being any 
person other than an issuer or domestic concern that, whilst in 




















Figure 3 depicts the exponential rise in fines obtained by the U.S. 
DOJ, Fraud Division. In 2010, a record breaking $830 million was col-
lected, 80% of which was attributable to four cases: Daimler A.G. ($93.6 
million), Technip S.A. ($240 million), Snamprogetti Netherlands ($240 
million), and Alcatel–Lucent ($92 million), each of which relate to mat-
ters arising under the FCPA. In 2011, the Fraud Division collected ap-
proximately $303 million, 72% of which related to a single FCPA matter 
                                                 
 80. Id. § 78dd-2. 
 81. Id. § 78dd-1. 
 82. Id. § 78dd-3. 
 83. Data sourced from Garrett & Ashley, supra note 58. 
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against JGC ($218 million). The DOJ has also received significant fines 
relating to non-prosecution agreements. It collected $150 million on one 
false claims matter in 2010
84


















The DOJ Fraud Division is responsible for all criminal enforcement 
and for civil enforcement of the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA with 
respect to domestic concerns, foreign companies, and nationals. Approx-
imately 31% of all deferred prosecution agreements relate to FCPA mat-
ters, and as Figure 4 shows, this division is responsible for no less than 
38% of all deferred prosecution agreements. 
What is also apparent is the strategic manner in which the division 
approaches its task. The DOJ has moved progressively through a series 
of sectors in furthering its stated strategic goal of rooting out global cor-
                                                 
 84. See Side Letter Agreement Exhibit 1, at 5; United States v. Forest Laboratories, Inc., No. 
1:10-cr-10294-NG, 2010 WL 3643601 (D. Mass. Sept. 15, 2010), available at http://www.justice. 
gov/civil/cpb/cases/cases/ForestPharm/Forest%20Laboratories%20Side%20Letter%20Agreement%
20Filed.pdf. 
 85. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Wachovia Bank N.A. Admits to Anticompetitive 
Conduct by Former Employees in the Municipal Bond Investments Market and Agrees to Pay $148 
Million to Federal and State Agencies (Dec. 8, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr 
/2011/December/11-at-1597.html; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, JPMorgan Chase Admits to 
Anticompetitive Conduct by Former Employees in the Municipal Bond Investments Market and 
Agrees To Pay $228 Million to Federal and State Agencies (July 7, 2011), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/July/11-at-890.html. 
 86. Data sourced from Garrett & Ashley, supra note 58. 
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ruption. In 2009, a senior Justice Department official noted that it was 
“intensely focused on rooting out foreign bribery” in the pharmaceutical 
industry.
87
 Many of these foreign pharmaceutical companies are located 
in countries that are known to pose greater FCPA risks—including Chi-
na, India, Russia, Italy, and Argentina.
88
 The DOJ has also recently 
brought cases against companies in the telecommunications,
89





 and entertainment industries.
92
 Most recently, it 
is focused on corruption in relation to the setting of benchmark interest 
rates, with continuing investigations into LIBOR and ISDAfix.
93
 
A close examination of the use of deferred prosecutions demon-
strates, however, that there are base tactical as well as laudable strategic 
calculations at play. In particular, there is a lack of coherence in how 
fines are determined, the level of discount applicable for cooperation, 
and whether independent monitors are mandated (the latter two acting as 
significant drivers for proposed extension to the United Kingdom). While 
the mechanism has amassed significant bounty for the exchequer (a fur-
ther advantage outlined by the Solicitor General), the fines have not been 
passed back to the victims of the offense, either through direct transfer to 
the countries where such illegalities have curtailed or stunted develop-
ment, or for capacity building. Equally, notwithstanding the high-flown 
rhetoric, there is a marked deviation in the application of the mechanism. 




                                                 
 87. See Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Att’y Gen., Criminal Div., Keynote Address to The Tenth 
Annual Pharmaceutical Regulatory and Compliance Congress and Best Practices Forum (Nov. 12, 
2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches-testimony/documents/11-12-09breu 
er-pharmaspeech.pdf. 
 88. See Mauro M. Wolfe, Does the US Government Have Limitless Jurisdiction Enforcing the 
FCPA?, CRIM. L. DIVISION (Int’l Bar Ass’n, London, U.K.), May 2010, at 1, available at 
http://www.martindale.com/members/Article_Atachment.aspx?od=299343&id=1055878&filename=
asr-1055918.pdf. 
 89. See United States v. Siemens Aktiengesellschaft, No. 08-CR-00367-RJL (D.D.C. Dec. 12, 
2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/siemens-aktiengesellscha 
ft.html. 
 90. See SEC v. NATCO Group, Inc., No. 4:10-CV-98 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 11, 2010), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2010/lr21374.htm. 
 91. See United States v. John W. Warwick, No. 3:09-cr-00449 (E.D. Va. Dec. 15, 2009), avail-
able at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/warwickj.html. 
 92. See United States v. Green, No. 08-CR-059-GW (C.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2008), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/greeng.html. 
 93. See Matthew Leising & Ben Moshinsky, U.K. Probing Alleged ISDAfix Manipulation, 
Regulator Says, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 11, 2013), available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-
09-10/u-k-probing-alleged-isdafix-rate-manipulation-regulator-says.html. 
 94. See infra Figure 5. 
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Figure 5 illustrates the frequency with which an external monitor 
was appointed as a proportion of the total number of negotiated settle-
ments entered into each year. External monitors have been appointed to a 
wide variety of crime types.
96
 The usage peaked in 2007. While the ap-
pointment of external monitors is subject to prosecutorial discretion, if 
the corporation had an effective compliance program in place, corporate 
monitors would arguably not be required.
97
 Since 2007, the decrease in 
the appointment of external monitors has coincided, therefore, with a 
marked increase in the requirement to install a compliance program as a 
term of the deferred prosecution agreement. It does, however, indicate 
huge capacity to direct corporate activity.
98
 
                                                 
 95. Data sourced from Garrett & Ashley, supra note 58. 
 96. For some example of a deferred prosecution agreement, see United States v. Sci. Applica-
tions Int’l Corp., No. s3 11 Cr. 121 (GBD) (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (wire fraud), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressconference/saicdeferredprosecutionagreementinformationandst
atementofresponsibility.pdf; United States v. KPMG, No. 05 Crim. 903 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (tax fraud), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/August05/kpmgdpagmt.pdf; United 
States v. Technip S.A., No. H-10-439 (S.D. Tex. 2010)  (FCPA), available at http://www.justice. 
gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/technip-sa/06-28-10-technip-agreement.pdf. 
 97. See Christopher M. Matthews, Fraud Chief: Effective Compliance Programs Can Prevent 
Monitors, MAIN JUSTICE: POL., POLICY & L. (May 24, 2010), http://www.mainjustice.com/justanti 
corruption/2010/05/24/fraud-section-chief-effective-compliance-programs-can-prevent-monitors/. 
 98. See Justin O’Brien, Staging “Macbeth” in Manhattan: Enforcement in the Aftermath of 
Libor and Standard Chartered, THOMSON REUTERS ACCELUS (Aug. 31, 2012), http://blogs.reute 
rs.com/financial-regulatory-forum/2012/08/31/staging-macbeth-in-manhattan-enforcement-in-the-
aftermath-of-libor-and-standard-chartered/. 
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While the attraction of the deferred prosecution is clear, it is less 
immediately apparent why corporations choose to settle. In part, it is a 
question of salvaging reputation. Corruption allegations are notoriously 
difficult to defend on reputational grounds.
99
 For the corporation, the de-
ferral also offers (at surface level) a range of potential benefits. First, it is 
sheltered from the expansive interpretation of the federal corporate crim-
inal liability regime, where even a low-level employee’s act can be im-
puted to the corporation, no matter how effective the corporation’s com-
pliance program may be to deter criminal misconduct.
100
 Second, it is 
shielded from ongoing legal uncertainty and negative publicity, factors of 
particular relevance if the corporation is public-facing (i.e., it has expo-
sure to consumer markets). Third, it offers an opportunity for the corpo-
ration to ex post revitalize its compliance program and embed within or-
ganizational structure mechanisms to ensure warranted commitment to 
stated values.
101
 In part, corporations have an additional incentive to co-
operate if the bargaining process does not mandate the appointment of an 
external monitor or a significant sentencing discount is applied.
102
 The 
process is best seen, therefore, not as an exercise in securing meaningful 
reform but as a litigation battleground in which justice and coherence 










                                                 
 99. A similar dynamic is apparent in accusations that banking entities have failed to put in 
place adequate procedures to combat anti-money laundering. See Justin O’Brien, Where the Buck 
Stops: The Common Link in Failures and Scandals at the World’s Leading Banks, AUSTL. FIN. REV., 
July 27, 2012, at R1, R10–11. 
 100. See James Gobert, Corporate Criminality: Four Models of Fault, 14 LEGAL STUD. 393, 
398 (1994). 
 101. But see KURT EICHENWALD, SERPENT ON THE ROCK xii–ix (2d ed. 1995); Peter J. Hen-
ning, Corporate Criminal Liability and the Potential for Rehabilitation, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1417, 
1428 (2009). 
 102. See infra Figure 6. 
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Figure 6 depicts the percentage discount received by the accused 
from the minimum fine recommended by the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines (USSG). To date, of the seventy-three deferred prosecution 
agreements entered into where fines were levied, only twenty have in-
cluded calculations of the penalty based on the USSG. For economic 
crimes, the USSG directs
104
 the court to adopt a mathematical structure 
where the fine range is a function of the seriousness of the crime and the 
culpability of the organization. The court then has discretion to make 
upward or downward adjustments to the fine range based on aggravat-
ing
105
 or mitigating circumstances.
106
 Sixteen of the twenty deferred 
prosecution agreements where fine calculations were disclosed received 
at least a 20% reduction. What the foregoing analysis also makes clear is 
that there is a remarkable lack of consistency in the application of the 
measure. To make matters worse, the manner in which these prosecu-
tions have been handled calls into question the DOJ’s standing as a mod-
el litigant. The inconsistent application also suggests that misuse and 
disproportionate power can call into question the legitimacy of the office, 
bringing the authority of the legal system into disrepute. 
                                                 
 103. Data sourced from Garrett & Ashley, supra note 58. 
 104. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.1 (2013). 
 105. See id. §§ 8C4.2–4.6. 
 106. See id. § 8C4.10. 
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B.  Case Study: LIBOR Settlements 
In September 2012, then-Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer 
defended the DOJ’s use of negotiated prosecutions, stating that 
[o]ne of the reasons why deferred prosecution agreements are such 
a powerful tool is that, in many ways, a DPA has the same punitive, 
deterrent, and rehabilitative effect as a guilty plea: when a company 
enters into a DPA with the government, or an NPA for that matter, 
it almost always must acknowledge wrongdoing, agree to cooperate 
with the government’s investigation, pay a fine, agree to improve its 
compliance program, and agree to face prosecution if it fails to sat-
isfy the terms of the agreement.
107
 
With respect to each LIBOR negotiated settlement, the bank in 
question was required to acknowledge and admit an attached Statement 
of Facts, which includes the essential criteria for establishing corporate 
criminal liability: 
[T]hat the wrongful acts taken by the participating employees in 
furtherance of this misconduct . . . were within the scope of their 
employment . . . that the participating employees intended, at least 
in part, to benefit [the bank] . . . [and] that due to the misconduct, 
[the bank] . . . has been exposed to substantial financial risk, and as 




These admissions are more than symbolic and have consequences for 
future civil litigation. 
Factual admissions made as part of a negotiated settlement will 
generally be admissible as statements by a party-opponent under Federal 
Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2). That rule provides that, when offered 
against an opposing party, a statement made by that party, his agent, or 
authorized representative, or a statement the opposing party has adopted 
or believed to be true, is not hearsay and is admissible if the court finds it 
is relevant.
109
 Most negotiated settlements contain a provision qualifying 
the incorporated statement of facts as a statement adopted by the compa-
ny.
110
 For example, agreements may provide that the company 
                                                 
 107. Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, Remarks at the New York 
City Bar Association (Sept. 13, 2012),  available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches/ 
2012/crm-speech-1209131.html. 
 108. See, e.g., Statement of Facts to Non-Prosecution Agreement Between U.S. Dep’t of Jus-
tice and Barclays Bank PLC ¶ 50 (June 26, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resour 
ces/9312012710173426365941.pdf. 
 109. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2). 
 110. See Statement of Facts to Non-Prosecution Agreement, supra note 108. 
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“acknowledges and accepts as accurate the facts set forth in the State-
ment of Facts attached” or “admits, accepts[,] and acknowledges respon-
sibility for the conduct of its [Employees], as set forth in the Statement of 
Facts.” Both of these provisions plainly indicate adoption on the part of 
the company. The specific terms and conditions of the three negotiated 
settlements reached to date in the LIBOR scandal are considered below. 
1.  Barclays 
Under the terms of the non-prosecution agreement dated June 26, 
2012, for the two-year term of the agreement, Barclays must (i) commit 
no United States crime whatsoever; (ii) disclose non-privileged infor-
mation with respect to the activities of Barclays and its agents concern-
ing all matters about which the DOJ inquires; (iii) bring to the DOJ’s 
attention all potentially criminal conduct by Barclays or any of its em-
ployees that relates to fraud or violations of the laws governing securities 
and commodities markets; and (iv) bring to the DOJ’s attention all crim-
inal and regulatory investigations, administrative proceedings, or civil 
actions brought by any governmental authority in the United States by or 
against Barclays or its employees that alleges fraud or violations of the 
laws governing securities and commodities markets.
111
 As “Barclays was 
the first bank to cooperate in a meaningful way in disclosing its con-
duct . . . [, which] included relevant facts that at the time had not come to 
the government’s attention,”
112
 there were no further conditions imposed 
aside from strengthening internal controls as mandated by the settlement 
with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission.
113
 
The first-mover advantage played by Barclays has manifested itself 
in both directions. While Barclays has inevitably suffered more than the 
other panel banks in terms of reputational damage by being the first bank 
to settle allegations of misconduct, its misconduct was significantly miti-
gated through cooperation with officials. No criminal indictment was 
deferred against Barclays and, to date, no actions have been pursued 
against any individuals. The methodology used by regulators to deter-
mine the appropriate fine or sanction for misconduct is incredibly 
opaque. For example, when Tracey McDermott of the U.K. Financial 
                                                 
 111. See Non-Prosecution Agreement Between U.S. Dep’t of Justice and Barclays Bank PLC, 
at 2 (June 26, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/33720127101733546 
9822.pdf. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Order Instituting Proceedings In the Matter of Barclays PLC Pursuant to Sections 6(c) and 
6(d) of the Commodity Exchange Act, C.F.T.C. No. 12-25, 2012 WL 2500330, at 34 (CTFC June 
26, 2012), available at http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/ 
legalpleading/enfbarclaysorder062712.pdf. 
496 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 37:475 
Services Authority (FSA) was asked by the Treasury Select Committee 
how the agency arrived at the fine of £85 million for Barclays, she re-
sponded: 
The penalty is set in accordance with our penalty policy that was 
applicable to misconduct at the time . . . there was no arithmetical 
calculation that applied. We take into account a number of factors, 
including the seriousness of the misconduct and including the level 
of co-operation during the investigation.
114
 
Further, the Committee noted that Barclays’s fine amounted to only 1% 
of their pre-tax profits and questioned how the FSA justified the suffi-
ciency of that as a fine. McDermott stated: 
We believe that it was appropriate. I think, as has been shown am-
ply by this case, the impact of enforcement action is not just about 
the level of the penalty; it is also about what comes out in the public 
domain and the reputational impact that follows. This was the most 
significant penalty we have imposed. It was almost twice the high-
est penalty we have imposed in the past. That reflected our view 
that this was the worst misconduct.
115
 
Surprisingly, the non-prosecution agreement comes less than two 
years after Barclays entered into a deferred prosecution agreement and 
paid $298 million to settle accusations it hid payments flowing into the 
United States from sanctioned countries including Cuba and Iran.
116
 
When Judge Emmet G. Sullivan of the District of Columbia issued an 
order in June 2012, asking the DOJ and Barclays to explain the ramifica-
tions of the LIBOR settlement on the earlier case, they responded in a 
joint filing with a technical argument: that the bank remained “‘in full 
compliance’ with the deferred prosecution agreement, which required it 
to be free of criminal conduct during the probationary period, because 
the LIBOR manipulation came earlier, between 2005 and 2009.”
117
 Such 
technical arguments highlight the difficulties in defining what constitutes 
                                                 
 114. TREASURY SELECT COMMITTEE, MINUTES OF EVIDENCE: ORAL EVIDENCE TAKEN 
BEFORE THE TREASURY COMMITTEE, 2012–13, H.C. 481-II (U.K.) (Question 1088), available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmtreasy/481/120716.htm. 
 115. Id. (Question 1091). 
 116. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Barclays Bank PLC Agrees to Forfeit $298 Mil-
lion in Connection with Violations of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act and the 
Trading with the Enemy Act (Aug. 18, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/ 
August/10-crm-933.html. 
 117. See Michael Rothfeld, Corporate Probation: Punishing or Punting?, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 
31, 2013), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444772804577621780469137056.html. 
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recidivist offending, a major issue in potentially drafting any accounta-
bility standards for negotiated settlements. 
2.  UBS 
The terms and conditions of the non-prosecution agreement entered 
into by UBS on December 18, 2012,
118
 are identical to Barclays, with 
one notable exception representing what has been referred to as a signifi-
cant shift in the DOJ’s enforcement strategy. The DOJ filed criminal 
charges against the Japanese subsidiary of UBS,
119
 which pled guilty to 
one count of wire fraud.
120
 By extracting a guilty plea from a wholly 
owned subsidiary, the DOJ is attempting to create a stronger deterrence 
mechanism by shielding the U.S.-based company from collateral damage 
associated with losing its license, but still sending a warning to industry. 
However, it is questionable as to whether criminal indictment of a minor, 
foreign subsidiary will have any deterrent effect on ultimate holding 
companies. In this case, UBS Securities Japan Co. has only limited ties 
to UBS
121
 and, as Japanese authorities notified UBS in advance to assure 
it that the subsidiary would not lose its license,
122 
 the impact of the guilty 
plea both on the subsidiary’s business operations and UBS itself appears 
to be negligible. Further, UBS is a Swiss bank. Any potential deterrent 
effects facilitated through a guilty plea of a wholly owned subsidiary on 
the U.S. market cannot be asserted until used against the subsidiary of a 
U.S. bank, such as JPMorgan or Citibank. 
Although the DOJ filed a criminal complaint in federal court in 
Manhattan against two Japan-based former senior UBS traders, Tom 
Hayes and Roger Darin, charging them with conspiracy, wire fraud, and 
price fixing in connection with their alleged attempts to manipulate Yen 
                                                 
 118. See Non-Prosecution Agreement Between U.S. Dep’t of Justice and UBS AG (Dec. 18, 
2012) , http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/1392012121911745845757.pdf [hereinafter UBS 
Non-Prosecution Agreement]; Statement of Facts to Non-Prosecution Agreement Between U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice and UBS AG (Dec. 18, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/694201212 
1911725320624.pdf. 
 119. See Plea Agreement, United States v. UBS Securities Japan Co., No. 3:12-CR-00268-
RNC (D. Conn. Dec. 18, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/ag/executed-plea-agreement-
appendix-b.pdf. 
 120. See id. ¶ 1; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2008). 
 121. See Richard Levick, The LIBOR Scandal: Prosecutors Have a New Plan, FORBES (Feb. 
28, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/richardlevick/2013/02/28/the-libor-scandal-prosecutors-
have-a-new-plan/. 
 122. See Ben Protess, Prosecutors, Shifting Strategy, Build New Wall Street Cases, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 18, 2013, at B1, available at http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/02/18/prosecutors-
build-a-better-strategy-to-go-after-wall-street/. 
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LIBOR interest rates,
123
 it declined to pursue criminal charges against 
UBS, “fearing such a move could endanger its stability.”
124
 Given UBS’s 
history of recidivist offending, the settlement has fuelled political debate 
on “too big to fail is too big to indict.” 
Forced into a $59.2 billion government bailout after piling up the 
biggest losses of any European lender from the global credit crisis,
125
 
UBS has been the subject of a number of instances of serious misconduct 
over the past five years. On September 15, 2011, UBS became aware of a 
massive loss, originally estimated at $2 billion, due to unauthorized trad-
ing allegedly by Kweku Adoboli, a trader on the Delta One desk of the 
firm’s investment bank.
 
Adoboli was arrested and later charged with 
fraud by abuse of position and false accounting dating as far back as 
2008.
 
UBS’s actual losses were subsequently confirmed as $2.3 billion
126
 
with the prosecutor in Adoboli’s trial noting that he “was a gamble or 
two from destroying Switzerland’s largest bank for his own benefit.”
127 
The scale of UBS’s losses in the Adoboli incident led to renewed 
calls for the global separation of commercial banking from investment 
banking.
128
 Just two years prior, on February 18, 2009, UBS agreed to 
pay a fine of $780 million to the U.S. government and entered into a de-
ferred prosecution agreement on charges of conspiring to defraud the 
United States by impeding the Internal Revenue Service.
129
 The settle-
ment followed a July 2008 United States Senate Report,
130
 which ac-
cused Swiss banks, including UBS and LGT Group, of helping wealthy 
                                                 
 123. See Complaint, United States v. Hayes, No. 12 MAG 3229 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2012), 
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http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-19595217. 
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Americans evade taxes through offshore accounts and calculated the total 
cost of this practice as being in excess of $100 billion annually.
131
 
Like Barclays, UBS’s misconduct was significantly mitigated for 
its cooperation. The non-prosecution agreement notes that “[a]lthough 
UBS was not the first bank to provide the Fraud Section with helpful in-
formation, and its self-disclosure and cooperation commenced after the 
Fraud Section had obtained certain evidence implicating UBS and, in 
particular, efforts to manipulate Yen benchmarks, UBS made its self-
disclosure before the Fraud Section had contacted UBS regarding the 
criminal investigation.”
132
 This implies that proactive rather than reactive 
disclosure may reward a cooperating company with a non-prosecution 
agreement, rather than a deferred prosecution agreement. 
3.  RBS 
In contrast to the prior two settlements, RBS entered into a deferred 
prosecution on February 6, 2013,
133
 and like UBS, its Japanese securities 
business pled guilty to one count of wire fraud tied to manipulation of 
Yen LIBOR.
134
 While the reasoning is opaque, it is most likely due to a 
number of factors. First, RBS’s misconduct was mitigated through reac-
tive cooperation with authorities rather than proactive cooperation—
unlike UBS and Barclays. Second, not only did RBS lack a compliance 
program sufficient to detect and prevent such conduct, but it also placed 
derivatives traders and submitters together at the same desk, magnifying 
potential conflicts of interest.
135
 Under the terms of the DPA, for the two-
year term of the agreement, RBS must (i) implement a compliance pro-
gram designed to prevent and detect manipulation and interbank coordi-
nation of benchmark rate submissions;
136
 and (ii) report to the DOJ upon 
request regarding its remediation and implementation of any compliance 
program and internal controls, policies, and procedures that relate to its 
submission of benchmark rates.
137
 No further conditions are imposed. If 
RBS has (i) committed any felony under U.S. federal law subsequent to 
the signing of the agreement; or (ii) at any time in connection with the 
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DPA prove deliberately false, incomplete, or misleading information; or 
(iii) otherwise breach the DPA, RBS will be subject to prosecution.
138
 
Despite investigations revealing manipulation and collusion on an 
epic scale, each negotiated settlement agreement is void of substantive 
terms and conditions aimed at reforming corporate governance and ef-
fecting cultural change. No independent external monitor was appointed 
in any settlement. While the settlements mitigate misconduct in exchange 
for cooperative behavior, it will be interesting to note if some of the ex-
pected future settlements contain more substantive provisions. 
IV.  MAPPING THE ACCOUNTABILITY DEFICIT 
The emphasis on cooperation within the deferred prosecution 
mechanism masks disproportionate prosecutorial leverage throughout the 
process. Prosecutors not only investigate potential crime—often with the 
complicity of the corporation to avoid actual prosecution—but also adju-
dicate based on guilt and degree of penalty. The agency determines 
whether to offer deferral and considers the extent of internal change re-
quired and degree of external oversight.
139
 Such agency discretion has 
been the subject of recent judicial criticism in the context of the SEC’s 
use of settlement agreements. A federal court in New York rejected a 
proposed $225 million settlement between Citigroup and the SEC on the 
grounds that it was neither fair, reasonable, nor in the public interest.
140
 
Judge Jed Rakoff argued that the failure to secure an admission of 
wrongdoing from a corporation he described as a recidivist offender had, 
as with a previous settlement involving Bank of America, privileged the 
“façade of enforcement.”
141
 The SEC appealed
142
 the decision not to en-
dorse the settlement suggesting that it introduced a new standard that 
limited regulatory capacity. In March 2012, the Second Circuit granted a 
stay of the District Court proceeding while it reviewed the appeal,
143
 not-
ing that Judge Rakoff did not “appear to have given deference to the 
SEC’s judgment.”
144
  Argument was heard on the merits of the case in 
February 2013, and the issue remains sub judice. 
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Similarly, in a settlement relating to violations of the Bank Secrecy 
Act, HSBC and the government argued that the court “lacked any inher-
ent authority over the approval or implementation of the DPA”
145
 itself. 
Judge John Gleeson for the Eastern District of New York noted that be-
cause the parties had elected to “place a criminal matter on the docket of 
a federal court,” that had subjected the deferred prosecution agreement to 
the legitimate exercise of the court’s inherent supervisory power to en-
sure the agreement does not “so transgress the bounds of lawfulness or 
propriety as to warrant judicial intervention to protect the integrity of the 
Court.” Judge Gleeson elected to retain supervisory power over the im-
plementation of the DPA, ordering the parties to file quarterly reports 
describing “all significant developments,” resolving any “doubts about 
whether a development is significant . . . in favor of inclusion.” 
Agency discretion has been similarly criticized in Australia in the 
context of civil penalty settlements. Like the United States, the usual 
practice in Australia is for courts to endorse an agreed penalty;
146
 howev-
er, this view was recently challenged by the Victorian Court of Appeal in 
ASIC v. Ingleby.
147
 The court’s reasoning is instructive: 
The lack of transparency in negotiated settlements may reinforce a 
perception that agreed penalties are not adequately grounded in fact 
and legal principle; In some cases, negotiated penalties appear to be 
inappropriately low; and some courts have expressed reservations as 
to the accuracy and sufficiency of the statements of agreed facts 
presented to them to ratify such penalties.
148
 
Crucially, the entire negotiation takes place outside the formal judi-
cial arena with a waiver of attorney–client privilege, while no longer de-
manded, implicitly required.
149
 The extent to which this has called into 
question the standing of the DOJ has been evident in a number of high-
profile failures, most notably in the overreach in the prosecution of indi-
vidual tax partners at KPMG. A federal judge found the prosecution to 
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be unconstitutional precisely because the accused partners, who had been 
following corporate policy, were denied ongoing legal representation at 
KPMG’s expense under the terms of a settlement agreement that includ-
ed the appointment of an external monitor, the payment of a $415 million 
fine, and a commitment to exit the individual high net worth tax planning 
market. 
For Justice Kaplan, the DOJ had been—at best—economical in its 
representations to the court, and its claim that the legal fee issue was 
made without “coercion” and “bullying” tactics could “be justified only 
by tortured definitions of those terms.”
150
 The decision, which was up-
held on appeal, significantly reduced prosecutorial discretion in this one 
area.
151
 The accountability problem is that the aggression is not confined 
to the capacity of individuals to secure representation. 
When cases have gone to trial, the willingness of prosecutors to act 
as model litigants is far from clear. In a Central California District Court 
last December, Justice A. Howard Matz found that the DOJ had over-
stepped the boundary of acceptable conduct in the prosecution of senior 
executives from the Lindsey Manufacturing Company.
152
 They had been 
accused of bribing two high-ranking employees of an electric utility 
company wholly owned by the Mexican government through payments 
made to an intermediary.
153
 Lurid testimony showed how these payments 
had funded the purchase of a Ferrari, a yacht, and American Express 
charges.
154
 The problem for the prosecutors is that the framing itself con-
stituted a framing. The ruling striking down the charges is instructive: 
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[I]t is with deep regret that this Court is compelled to find that the 
Government team allowed a key FBI agent to testify untruthfully 
before the grand jury, inserted material falsehoods into affidavits 
submitted to magistrate judges in support of applications for search 
warrants and seizure warrants, improperly reviewed e-mail commu-
nications between one Defendant and her lawyer, recklessly failed 
to comply with disclosure obligations, posed questions to certain 
witnesses in violation of the Court’s rulings, engaged in questiona-
ble behavior during closing argument and even made misrepresenta-
tions to the Court. 
The Government has acknowledged making many ‘mistakes’ as it 
characterizes them. ‘Many’ indeed. So many in fact, and so varied, 
and occurring over so lengthy a period (between 2008 and 2011) 
that they add up to an unusual and extreme picture of a prosecution 
gone badly awry. To paraphrase what former Senator Everett 
Dirksen supposedly said, ‘[A] few mistakes here and a few mistakes 
there and pretty soon you’re talking misconduct.’
155
 
The misconduct extends to investigative stages. In a second high 
profile case, known as the “Africa Sting” operation, the DOJ charged 
twenty-two employees of military and law enforcement agencies of con-
spiring to bribe government officials in West Africa. It followed an ex-
tensive undercover FBI investigation.
156
 The operation focused on luring 
the defendants to believe that a 20% commission payment to an interme-
diary would be used to secure a $15 million procurement order to up-
grade the presidential guard, with at least half of the money going direct-
ly to the Gabonese Minister of Defense.
157
 The high profile operation led 
to the arrest of twenty-one individuals at a trade show in Las Vegas and a 
further individual in Miami on June 18, 2010.
158
 
The DOJ claimed it was the “largest single investigation and prose-
cution of individuals in the history of the DOJ’s enforcement of the 
[FCPA].”
159
 One hundred and fifty field officers were involved in the 
operation in the United States. In addition, the Metropolitan police exe-
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cuted search warrants in London. The sting operation was, according to 
the FBI, played out “with all the intrigue of a spy novel.”
160
 
Unfortunately, for both the DOJ and the FBI, there was little if any-
thing of substance. In a rare piece of British reporting on the scandal, 
which led to the arrest and prosecution of a British citizen, David Painter, 
the mid-market tabloid the Daily Mail described the sting as “a huge, 
sleazy[,] and ultimately doomed FBI operation. . . .[A] deadly weapon in 
their arsenal against corruption but the biggest investigation of its type in 
DOJ–FBI history brought only humiliation, controversy[,] and complete 
legal defeat.”
161
 David Painter, who lost his business and accrued mil-
lions of dollars in legal fees, is quoted as stating, “[W]ith the complicity 
of the DOJ and FBI, I was told this deal had been approved by the U.S. 
State Department.”
162
 Richard Bistrong, then-husband of Nancy Soder-
berg, a former United States ambassador to the United Nations, was in-
strumental in pitching the deal, adding to its authenticity.
163
 The DOJ 
was forced, eventually, to file a motion to dismiss with prejudice. 
In accepting the argument, following a second trial, Judge Richan 
Leon found that the federal prosecutors were susceptible to pursuing a 
“very, very aggressive conspiracy theory that was pushing its already 
generous elasticity to its outer limits. Of course in the second trial that 
elastic snapped in the absence of the necessary evidence to sustain it.”
164
 
He also castigated the DOJ for its handling of the discovery process, say-




It is apparent from these techniques that while the enforcement en-
vironment is, as Ernst & Young reports, “aggressive,” it has also re-
vealed significant tactical and strategic weaknesses.
166
 There is a signifi-
cant danger that without considerable enhancements in oversight that the 
mechanism could disrepute the legitimacy of prosecutorial agencies and 
the authority of the judicial system. As will be explored more fully be-
low, the United Kingdom proposals differ from the mechanism used in 
the United States in that non-prosecution agreements are not to be pur-
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sued. Secondly, the proposals signal the desirability of judicial scrutiny 
much earlier in the process to address explicitly the lack of accountabil-
ity.
167
 Although the refinement has the capacity to enhance transparency 
and accountability, much detail remains to be ironed out. The absence of 
detail, combined with the evidence of extortionary impulses in the Unit-
ed States, suggests the need for caution before adopting such invasive 
powers. 
V. THE PERILS OF TRANSPLANTATION 
The difficulties associated with prosecuting white-collar and gen-
eral economic crime continue to dog prosecutorial authorities in the 
United Kingdom. The decision by the Serious Fraud Office to discontin-
ue an investigation into the collapse of Britain’s largest hedge fund, 
based on the grounds that there was no reasonable chance of a criminal 
conviction, has done much to undermine already weakened confidence in 
prosecutorial power and acumen.
168
 The decision mirrored the explana-
tion offered by the FSA not to prosecute those involved in the collapse of 
RBS. The collapse of RBS was talismanic of poor corporate governance 
in the United Kingdom.
169
 The foreword of the FSA’s report into the 
failure, penned by the organization’s chairman, Lord Adair Turner, pro-
vides the rationale for the exhaustive investigation: “Quite reasona-
bly, . . . people want to know why RBS failed. And they want to under-
stand whether failure resulted from a level of incompetence, a lack of 
integrity, or dishonesty, which can be subject to legal sanction.”
170
 The 
short answer provided is that it cannot. According to the FSA, the legal 
framework in the United Kingdom made it impossible to launch proceed-
ings that had a reasonable prospect of success.
171
 
One mechanism to address both sets of failings has been the intro-
duction of the deferred prosecution, as provided by the CC Act.
172
 The 
model for England and Wales looks to the United States’ deferred prose-
cution agreement model for guidance. However, it seeks to incorporate a 
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far greater level of judicial oversight, transparency, and consistency 
throughout the process, ultimately requiring judicial approval before a 
deferred prosecution agreement can be entered into. 
As noted above, one of the major accountability deficiencies asso-
ciated with the application of the deferred prosecution mechanism in the 
United States is the lack of an underpinning statutory basis. Instead, 
prosecutors rely upon the United States Attorney’s Manual, Principles of 
Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations. This manual sets out the 
circumstances in which it is appropriate to enter into a deferred prosecu-
tion agreement and the factors to consider when investigating, charging, 
and discussing an agreement with respect to corporate crimes.
173
 
The U.K. consultation paper called for consideration of similar fac-
tors.
174
 The paper noted that the Director of Public Prosecutions and the 
Director of the Serious Fraud Office should publish a Code of Practice 
setting out the factors prosecutors should take into account in deciding 
whether to enter into a deferred prosecution agreement.
175
 The require-
ment to publish a Code of Practice is mandated under the CC Act,
176
 alt-
hough the Code itself has yet to be drafted. The unresolved policy ques-
tion focuses on the degree to which the Code of Practice can limit prose-
cutorial discretion. Further, the CC Act provides that any decision to en-
ter into a deferred prosecution agreement must be exercised personally
177
 
by a “designated prosecutor.”
178
 By contrast, in the United States, there is 
no requirement for an equivalent designated prosecutor, the Attorney 
General, to determine whether and when deferred prosecution agree-
ments are appropriate. 
In contrast to the United States’ approach, where the terms and 
conditions of the deferred prosecution are ad hoc and subject to prosecu-
torial discretion, under the United Kingdom model, the content of a de-
ferred prosecution agreement is set out under the CC Act. In addition to 
requiring a statement of facts, the terms and conditions may include, but 
are not limited to, the following requirements: 
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1. To pay the prosecutor a financial penalty; 
2. To compensate victims of the alleged [offense]; 
3. To donate money to a charity or other third party; 
4. To disgorge any profits made by a person from the alleged of-
fence; 
5. To implement a compliance program relating to the person’s 
policies or to the training of person’s employees or both; 
6. To cooperate in any investigation related to the alleged [of-
fense]; 
7. To pay any reasonable costs of the prosecutor in relation to the 




Perhaps the biggest departure from the United States model is the 
inclusion of early judicial intervention. Under the United Kingdom ap-
proach, a judge is to be involved in determining whether a deferred pros-
ecution agreement was justified in the first instance. This would, accord-
ing to the consultation paper, ensure that a “prosecutor is not entering 
into a ‘cosy deal’ with a commercial organization ‘behind closed 
doors.’”
180
 Under the CC Act, once a prosecutor has made a decision in 
principle that a deferred prosecution is likely to be suitable and appropri-
ate, preliminary proceedings would commence before the Crown 
Court.
181
 At the initial proceedings, the court would be presented with an 
outline of the basic agreed facts, a draft indictment or charge sheet, the 
proposed conditions of the deferred prosecution agreement, and an out-
line of the areas still being considered.
182
 The court would consider 
whether the proposed deferred prosecution agreement was in the interests 
of justice based on the facts presented and that the proposed terms were 
“fair, reasonable[,] and proportionate.”
183
 
In the United States, the presiding judge is not involved in the ne-
gotiation of the terms of the deferred prosecution agreement. The analo-
gous standard with respect to settlement agreements proposed by the 
SEC is whether the agreement is “fair, reasonable, adequate, and in the 
public interest,” although such a broad mandate has, as discussed above, 
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recently caused significant judicial and academic controversy.
184
 Under 
the United Kingdom model, judicial approval is also required for the fi-
nal agreement.
185
 The hearing for this purpose would start in private to 
allow the agreed deferred prosecution agreement terms to be presented to 
the judge and allow discussion and resolution of any final issues.
186
 The 
court would then determine if the final deferred prosecution agreement 
was in fact “fair, reasonable[,] and proportionate.” If so, it would be ap-
proved in open court to ensure openness and transparency.
187
 
The advantage of the United Kingdom approach is that an indica-
tion could be obtained at the initial hearing as to whether the court con-
siders the deferred prosecution agreement to be appropriate in principle. 
This preliminary hurdle may avoid some of the issues that are currently 
arising in the United States as to what is deemed to be in the “public in-
terest.” It would also provide an opportunity for the court to question the 
prosecutorial methods deployed in presenting the case. However, the 
same factors that convince a corporation to accept an agreement—a de-
sire to settle to avoid ongoing reputational risk or avoid public exposure 
of compliance failure—may also inhibit willingness to challenge, leaving 
the court in a difficult position of striking out the liberty to contract on 
intuition rather than evidence. 
The second area in which the United Kingdom model attempts to 
differ from the United States template is in the emphasis on transparency 
and consistency. The consultation paper suggests specific guidelines 
would provide “more detailed starting points or ranges for financial pen-
alties and perhaps other conditions.”
188
 This approach appears to be rep-
licating the ranges, categories, and starting points for deferred prosecu-
tion agreement penalties and conditions that the sentencing guidelines 
do.
189
 However, the court is given permission to stray from the guide-
lines, if the “interests of justice” so demand.
190
 In contrast, the United 
States does not publish guidelines as to the terms that might compose a 
deferred prosecution agreement, which is left to the total discretion of the 
prosecutor. While the number of answered questions—including the 
scope of the yet to be drafted code of practice for prosecutors, procedural 
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rules and operational guidance, and the capacity of deferred prosecutions 
to extend to global settlements—remain undefined, the stated benefits 
associated with the United Kingdom’s approach are best seen as potential 
rather than achieved. Without much more granular information, it is 
foolhardy to expect that the actual operation of the United Kingdom sys-
tem will differ in substance from that in the United States. It is unlikely, 
for example, that a major corporation having entered into a settlement 
agreement would complain to a judge that it was forced to do so. Equal-
ly, there is no evidence, to date, that the British authorities have drawn 
up granular guidance on how independent experts should operate. These 
lacunae make the negotiated prosecution mechanism subject to major 
accountability deficits. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Irrespective of whether they are domiciled in the United States or 
the United Kingdom, multinational corporations now face significantly 
enhanced litigation risk if they have operations within or pass financing 
through these jurisdictions. The enforcement net is progressively widen-
ing. As a consequence, multinational corporations must adopt a much 
more considered approach as to what constitutes effective compliance, 
irrespective of whether domestic enforcement is either lacking or robust. 
Understanding the variable enforcement agendas and associated litiga-
tion risks are therefore pivotal corporate as well as policy imperatives. 
Those enforcement agendas provide increasing power to prosecutorial 
agendas that have the capacity to undermine regulatory effectiveness, 
precisely because the lack of accountability risks overreach. 
In the United States—as the LIBOR settlements demonstrate—
although a corporation may admit to extensive and pervasive abuse of 
the law, prosecutorial discretion can allow it to escape criminal indict-
ment and substantive governance overhauls in exchange for cooperation. 
In the absence of rehabilitative terms and conditions, it is difficult to see 
how these settlements achieve accountability or can be deemed to be in 
the public interest. Although steps have been taken to improve the ac-
countability of deferral in the United Kingdom, they lack the granularity 
to provide confidence that abuses seen in the United States will be ame-
liorated in full. The Exchequer may find itself a net beneficiary, but the 
sustainability of reform as well as its coherence may not. 
